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Abstract. Information-theoretic key agreement is impossible to achieve from scratch and must be based
on some — ultimately physical — premise. In 2005, Barrett, Hardy, and Kent showed that unconditional
security can be obtained in principle based on the impossibility of faster-than-light signaling; however,
their protocol is inefficient and cannot tolerate any noise. While their key-distribution scheme uses
quantum entanglement, its security only relies on the impossibility of superluminal signaling, rather
than the correctness and completeness of quantum theory. In particular, the resulting security is device
independent. Here we introduce a new protocol which is efficient in terms of both classical and quantum
communication, and that can tolerate noise in the quantum channel. We prove that it offers device-
independent security under the sole assumption that certain non-signaling conditions are satisfied. Our
main insight is that the XOR of a number of bits that are partially secret according to the non-signaling
conditions turns out to be highly secret. Note that similar statements have been well-known in classical
contexts. Earlier results had indicated that amplification of such non-signaling-based privacy is impossible
to achieve if the non-signaling condition only holds between events on Alice’s and Bob’s sides. Here, we
show that the situation changes completely if such a separation is given within each of the laboratories.
1 Introduction, Motivation, and Our Result
1.1 Minimizing Assumptions for Information-Theoretic Key Agreement
It is well-established that information-theoretic secrecy must be based on certain premises such as
noise in communication channels [46], [18], [34], a limitation on an adversary’s memory [33], [19],
or the uncertainty principle of quantum physics [7]. In traditional quantum key distribution, the
security proof is based on
1. the postulates of quantum physics,
2. the assumptions that the used devices transmit and operate on the specified quantum systems,
and
3. that Eve does not get information about the generated key out of the legitimate partners’ labo-
ratories.
This article is concerned with a variant of quantum key distribution which allows the first two as-
sumptions to be dropped, if at the same time, the third is augmented by the assumption that no
unauthorized information is exchanged between the legitimate laboratories. One possibility to guar-
antee this is via the non-signaling postulate of relativity, if different measurement events are carried
out in a space-like separated way. Of particular importance is device independence (i.e., dropping
condition 2), for two reasons. First, the necessity to trust the manufacturer is never satisfactory.
Second, the security of traditional protocols for quantum key distribution relies crucially on the fact
that single Qbits (i.e., photons) are sent. For instance, the BB84 protocol [7] becomes completely
insecure if larger systems, such as pairs of photons, are transmitted. With present technology, this
is a significant issue. The fact that practical deviations from the theoretical model open the possi-
bility of attacks has been demonstrated experimentally, see [22], [21], [41], [47], [43], and references
therein.
The question of device-independent security has been raised by Mayers and Yao in [36].4 That
such security is possible in principle follows from [5]; however, only a zero secret-key rate has been
4 The work by Mayers and Yao initiated further investigation on how to test the correct working of quantum devices
(not restricted to quantum cryptography) [45], [37], [28].
achieved, and in addition the classical communication cost is exponential. Later schemes that are
robust against noise and achieve a positive key rate have been proven secure against certain restricted
types of attacks [3], [42], [2], [1]. The current state of the art is that security holds against arbitrary
attacks, but no (quantum) correlation is introduced between subsequent measurements, see e.g., [38].
1.2 Relativity-Based Key Distribution
It is possible to generate a secret key assuming only that information transmission faster than at
the speed of light is impossible. The basic idea, as proposed by Barrett, Hardy, and Kent [5], is
as follows: By communication over a quantum channel, two parties, Alice and Bob, generate some
shared entangled quantum state. They carry out measurements in a space-like-separated way, i.e.,
no signaling is possible between the measurement events. Alice and Bob then verify the statistics
of the measurement outcomes. Given that these satisfy certain specified properties, the privacy of
the data follows directly from the correlations in the resulting data and is independent of whatever
quantum systems the devices operate on. It is not even necessary to assume that the possibilities of
what an adversary can do is limited by quantum physics: The latter guarantees the protocol to work
(i.e., leads to the expected correlations, the occurrence of which can be verified), but the security is
completely independent of it. A consequence is that protocols can be given which are secure if either
quantum physics or relativity (or both, of course) is correct.
How is it possible to derive secrecy directly from correlations? In quantum physics, this is well-
known: Quantum correlations, called entanglement, are monogamous to some extent [44]: If Alice
and Bob are maximally entangled, then Eve factors out and is independent. However, we do not
know such an effect classically: If Alice and Bob have highly correlated bits, Eve can nevertheless
know them. The point is that we have to look at the — so-called non-local — input-output behavior
of systems.
1.3 Systems, Correlations, and Non-Locality
In order to explain non-local correlations, we introduce the notion of a two-party system, defined by
its joint input-output behavior PXY |UV (see Figure 1).
PXY |UV
U V
X Y
Fig. 1. A two-party system. If it does not allow for message transmission, it is called a box.
Definition 1. A system is a bi- (or more-) partite conditional probability distribution PXY |UV . It
is local if PXY |UV =
∑n
i=1wiP
i
X|UP
i
Y |V holds for some weights wi ≥ 0 and conditional distributions
P iX|U and P
i
Y |V , i = 1, . . . , n. A system is signaling if it allows for message transmission, i.e., it
is non-signaling if
∑
x PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) =
∑
x PXY |UV (x, y, u
′, v) for all y, v (and similar with the
roles of the interfaces exchanged). We call a non-signaling system a box.
Lemma 1 states that locality is equivalent to the possibility that the outputs to alternative inputs
are consistently pre-determined (see Figure 2).
Lemma 1. For any system PXY |UV , where U and V are the ranges of U and V , respectively, the
following conditions are equivalent:
1. PXY |UV is local,
2. there exist random variables Xu (u ∈ U) and Yv (v ∈ V) with a joint distribution such that the
marginals satisfy PXuYv = PXY |U=u,V=v.
Proof. Assume first that PXY |UV is local, i.e., PXY |UV =
∑
wiP
i
X|UP
i
Y |V . For U = {u1, u2, . . . , um}
and V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, define
PXu1 ···XumYv1 ···Yvn (x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn) :=
∑
wiP
i
X|U=u1(x1) · · ·P
i
X|U=um(xm) · P
i
Y |V=v1(y1) · · ·P
i
Y |V=vn(yn) .
This distribution has the desired property.
To see the reverse direction, let Xu1 · · ·XumYv1 · · · Yvn be the shared randomness w. 
PXY |UV
u v
Xu1, . . . , Xum Yv1 , . . . , Yvn
Fig. 2. Locality means that alternative outputs consistently coexist.
We cryptographically exploit the contraposition of the statement: As soon as a system behaves non-
locally, the outputs cannot exist before the input is given, i.e., the measurement is actually carried
out. In particular, these outputs cannot have been stored in the devices previously, and they cannot
be known to an adversary.
1.4 Non-Locality Implies Secrecy
In order to explain this idea more explicitly, let us consider a specific example of a system (see also
Figure 3).
Definition 2. [40] A Popescu-Rohrlich box (or PR box for short) is the following bipartite system
PXY |UV : For each input pair (u, v), the random variable X is a random bit and we have
Prob [X ⊕ Y = U · V ] = 1 . (1)
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Fig. 3. The PR box.
John Bell’s theorem from 1964 [6] implies that this system is indeed non-local. More precisely,
any system that behaves like a PR box with probability greater than 75% is. The reason is that
the four conditions represented by (1) (one for each input combination) are contradictory, and only
three can be satisfied at a time. Interestingly, when one is allowed to measure entangled quantum
states, one can achieve roughly 85%.
The type of non-locality characterized by the PR box is often called CHSH non-locality after [17]
and we will sometimes call condition (1) CHSH condition.
Note that the PR box is non-signaling: X and Y separately are perfectly random bits and
independent of the input pair. On the other hand, a system PXY |UV (where all variables are bits)
satisfying (1) is non-signaling only if the outputs are completely unbiased, given the input pair,
i.e., PX|U=u,V=v(0) = PY |U=u,V=v(0) = 1/2. In other words, the output bit can neither be pre-
determined, nor slightly biased. Assume that Alice and Bob share any kind of physical system, carry
out space-like separated measurements (hereby excluding message transmission), and measure data
having the statistics of a PR box. The outputs must then be perfectly secret bits because even when
conditioned on an adversary’s complete information, the correlation between Alice and Bob must
still be non-signaling and fulfill equation (1).
Unfortunately, however, the behavior of perfect PR boxes does not occur in nature: Quantum
physics is non-local, but not maximally so. Can we also obtain secret bits from weaker, quantum-
physically achievable, non-locality? Barrett, Hardy, and Kent [5] have shown that the answer is yes.
Their protocol is, however, inefficient: In order to reduce the probability that the adversary learns
a generated bit shared by Alice and Bob below ε, they have to communicate Θ(1/ε) Qbits.
If we measure maximally entangled quantum states, we can get at most 85%-approximations
to the PR-box’s behavior. Fortunately, any non-locality implies some secrecy. In order to illustrate
this, consider a system approximating a PR box with probability 1−ε for all inputs. More precisely,
we have
Prob [X ⊕ Y = U · V |U = u, V = v] = 1− ε (2)
for all (u, v) ∈ {0, 1}2. Then, what is the maximal possible bias p := Prob [X = 0|U = 0, V = 0]
such that the system is non-signaling?
x PX|U=u,V=v(0) PY |U=u,V=v(0) y
0 p p− ε 0
0 p p− ε 1
1 p− 2ε p− ε 0
1 p− 2ε p− ε 1
We explain the table: Because of (2), the bias of Y , given U = V = 0, must be at least p − ε.
Because of non-signaling, X’s bias must be p as well when V = 1, and so on. Finally, condition (2)
for U = V = 1 implies p − ε − (1 − (p − 2ε)) ≤ ε, hence, p ≤ 1/2 + 2ε. For any ε < 1/4, this is a
non-trivial bound. (This reflects the fact that ε = 1/4 is the “local limit.”)
Conditioned on Eve’s entire information, this reads: Weak non-locality means weak secrecy.
Can it be amplified? Privacy amplification is a concept well-known from classical [9], [25], [8] and
quantum [26] cryptography, and means transforming a weakly secret string into a highly secret key
by hashing. These results are not applicable with respect to non-signaling privacy since this is a
strictly stronger notion, i.e., the attacker has more possible courses of action.5 In [23] it has been
pessimistically argued that privacy amplification of non-signaling secrecy is impossible, the problem
being that certain collective attacks exist that leave the adversary with significant information about
the final key, however the latter is obtained from the raw key.
5 The only restriction by which the possibilities of such an adversary are limited is the non-signaling condition. Non-
signaling secrecy has been shown achievable under the additional assumption that the adversary can only attack
each of the boxes separately [3], [42], [2]. In general, however, an adversary may of course attack them jointly —
this corresponds to a coherent attack. In quantum mechanics, three types of attacks — individual, collective, and
coherent — are distinguished [12], [11], [10]. In an individual attack, the eavesdropper attacks and measures each
system identically and independently; in a collective attack the adversary still attacks each system identically and
independently, but can make a joint measurement; finally the most general attack is a coherent attack, where no
restrictions apply.
Fortunately, the situation changes completely when one assumes a non-signaling condition be-
tween the individual measurements performed within Alice’s as well as Bob’s laboratories (see Fig-
ure 7). This non-signaling condition could, for instance, be enforced by a space-like separation of the
individual measurement events. In [29], Masanes has shown that in this case, privacy amplification
is possible in principle — using as hash function a function chosen at random from the set of all
functions.6 Later, he has shown that it is sufficient to consider a two-universal set of functions (this
proof is included in [32], Section IV.C).
1.5 Main Result
We show that there exists a protocol for efficiently generating a secret key, whose security is based
on non-signaling conditions only (Theorem 3). The protocol consists of measuring n copies of a max-
imally entangled state, where all 2n measurement events are supposed to be space-like separated.
Our result is distinct from Masanes’ in the sense that we show a single explicit function, namely
the XOR, to be a good privacy-amplification function. More precisely, we prove a lemma that the
adversary’s probability of correctly predicting the XOR of the outcomes of n boxes is exponentially
(in n) close to 1/2 (see Lemma 6). This can be seen as a generalization of the well-known fact that
the XOR of many partially uniform bits is almost uniform and may be of independent interest.
Since the security of our protocol, which is universally composable, is implied by the observed cor-
relations alone, it is automatically device-independent. This means that nothing needs to be known
about the internal workings of the quantum devices used for its implementation (such as photon
sources or detectors) and their manufacturer need not be trusted. Moreover, a certain amount of
noise can be tolerated: Our scheme has a positive key-generation rate whenever the correlations
approximate PR boxes with an accuracy exceeding 80% and the output bits are correlated with
more than 98% when Alice and Bob both choose to measure in the first basis (see Figure 4).
Fig. 4. The parameter regions for which key agreement is possible (red), reachable by quantum
mechanics (blue) and their intersection (green). ε is the probability of violating the CHSH condition
(i.e., X ⊕ Y 6= U · V ) for uniform inputs, and δ the probability of not having the same output bits
on input (0, 0).
1.6 Outline
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and the general set
of possible strategies of a non-signaling adversary. In Section 3, we motivate our security definition.
6 Masanes’ result implies that there exists a fixed function which can be used for privacy amplification, but the proof
is non-constructive, i.e., the function cannot be given explicitly.
Then we first consider the case of a single approximation of a PR box and give a tight bound on
the adversarial knowledge on the outputs of such a box (Section 4). We then proceed to the general
case of n approximations of a PR box (Section 5). We show that the XOR of several output bits
is as secure as when an adversary attacks each of the boxes independently and individually, hence,
the XOR is a good privacy-amplification function. In Section 6, we show that we can use the XOR
of several bits to do information reconciliation and privacy amplification such as to obtain a secret
key. We determine the key rate, show how we can attain the region allowing for a positive key rate
using quantum mechanics and finally give the resulting key generation protocol.
2 Modeling Non-Signaling Adversaries
When Alice, Bob, and Eve carry out measurements on a (joint) physical system, they can choose
their measurement settings (the inputs) and receive their respective outcomes (the outputs). It is,
therefore, natural to model the situation by a tripartite input-output system, characterized by a
conditional distribution PXY Z|UVW . The question we study in the following is: Given a certain
two-party system shared by Alice and Bob, which extensions to a three-party system, including
the adversary Eve, are possible? And is it possible for Alice and Bob to create a secret key by
interacting with their respective parts of the system and communicating over a public channel?
The only condition hereby is that the entire system must be non-signaling ,7 i.e., the input/output
PXY Z|UVW
U V
X Y
W Z
Alice Bob
Eve
Fig. 5. The tripartite scenario including the eavesdropper.
behavior of one side tells nothing about the input on the other side(s) (and also, dividing the ends
of the box in any two subsets, the input/output behavior of one subset tells nothing about the input
of the other).
Condition 1 [5] The system PXY Z|UVW must not allow for signaling:
∑
x
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v, w) =
∑
x
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u′, v, w) ∀y, z, v, w∑
y
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v, w) =
∑
y
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v′, w) ∀x, z, u,w∑
z
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v, w) =
∑
z
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v, w′) ∀x, y, u, v
If a system is non-signaling between its interfaces, this also means that its marginal systems are well-
defined: What happens at one of the interfaces does not depend on any other input. This implies
that at all the interfaces, an output can always be provided immediately after the input has been
given.
On the other hand, we do allow for Eve to delay her choice of input (measurement) until all of
Alice’s and Bob’s communication is finished — in particular Eve knows the protocol of Alice and Bob
7 In practice, the non-signaling condition can be ensured by carrying out all measurements in a space-like separated
way (the system is then non-signaling by relativity theory) or, alternatively, by placing every partial system into
a shielded laboratory. It is also a direct consequence of the assumption usually made in quantum key distribution,
that the Hilbert space is the tensor product of the Hilbert spaces associated with each party.
and could get information about Alice and Bob’s inputs, e.g. by wiretapping messages exchanged
by them during the protocol, and she can adapt her strategy.
This tripartite scenario can be reduced to a bipartite one: Because Eve cannot signal to Alice
and Bob (even together) by her choice of input, we must have
∑
z
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v, w) =
∑
z
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v, w′) = PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) ,
and this is exactly the marginal box as seen by Alice and Bob. We can, therefore, see Eve’s input
as a choice of convex decomposition of Alice’s and Bob’s box and her output as indicating one part
of the decomposition. Further, the condition that even Alice and Eve together must not be able to
signal to Bob and vice versa means that the distribution conditioned on Eve’s outcome, P zXY |UV ,
must also be non-signaling between Alice and Bob. Informally, we can write
A B = p(z0|w) · A B
z0
+ p(z1|w) · A B
z1
+ · · ·
and this also covers all possibilities available to Eve. Formally, we define:
Definition 3. A box partition of a given bipartite box PXY |UV is a family of pairs (pz,P zXY |UV ),
where pz is a weight and P zXY |UV is a box, such that PXY |UV =
∑
z p
z · P zXY |UV .
This definition allows us to change between the scenario of a bipartite box plus box partition and
the scenario of a tripartite box, as stated in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2. For any given tripartite box, PXY Z|UVW , any input w induces a box partition of the
bipartite box PXY |UV parametrized by z with pz := p(z|w) and P zXY |UV := PXY |UV,Z=z,W=w.
Lemma 3. Given a bipartite box PXY |UV let W be a set of box partitions w = {(pz, P zXY |UV )}z.
Then the tripartite box, where the input of the third party is w ∈ W, defined by PXY Z|UV ,W=w(z) :=
pz · P zXY |UV is non-signaling and has marginal box PXY |UV .
Even if Alice and Bob have several input and output interfaces we need to assume that they
belong to a single big system which can be attacked by Eve as one, as depicted in Figure 6. This
also implies that Eve only has a single input and output variable (of any range). This scenario is
analogous to Eve being able to do coherent attacks in a quantum-key-distribution protocol.
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Fig. 6. Alice and Bob share n boxes which are independent from their viewpoint. However, Eve can
attack all of them at once.
However, Alice and Bob can make sure that the non-signaling condition holds between all of
their 2n input/output interfaces. The non-signaling condition then needs to hold even given Eve’s
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Fig. 7. The dashed lines mean space-like separation.
output z. We, therefore, extend Condition 1 from the tripartite to the (2n + 1)-partite case in the
obvious way and call such a system (2n+ 1)-partite non-signaling (see Figure 7).
We study the particular case where Alice and Bob share n approximations of a PR box, i.e.,
each of the 2n input/output interfaces takes one bit input and gives one bit output.8 Note that
we assume that the boxes Alice and Bob share were created by Eve. We can, therefore, not make
any assumption about their form (i.e., the probability distribution describing them). In particular,
they need not be independent approximations of PR boxes. However, Alice and Bob can test the
properties of their systems and can ensure that the non-signaling condition holds between all 2n
ends and even given Eve’s output z, i.e., P zXY |UV must not allow for signaling between any of the
2n input/output bit pairs shared between Alice and Bob. We restate the condition, under which we
will prove security:
Condition 1’ The system PXYZ|UVW must not allow for signaling between any of the 2n + 1
marginal systems:∑
xi
PXYZ|UVW (x,y, z,u\ui, ui,v, w) =
∑
xi
PXYZ|UVW (x,y, z,u\ui, u′i,v, w) ∀x\xi,y, z, ,u\ui,v, w
∑
yi
PXYZ|UVW (x,y, z,u,v\vi, vi, w) =
∑
yi
PXYZ|UVW (x,y, z,u,v\vi, v′i, w) ∀x,y\yi, z, ,u,v\vi, w
∑
z
PXYZ|UVW (x,y, z,u,v, w) =
∑
z
PXYZ|UVW (x,y, z,u,v, w′) ∀x,y,u,v ,
where we used the notation x\xi to abbreviate x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . xn, i.e., all xj for which j 6= i.
Note that the above conditions imply the non-signaling condition between any partition of the
input/output interfaces. An explicit proof of this is given in Appendix G.1.
3 Security Definition
3.1 Indistinguishability
We define security in the context of random systems [35]. A system is an object taking inputs and
giving outputs — such as, for example, a box or several boxes. The different interfaces, number of
interactions, and, if there is, the time-wise ordering of these inputs and outputs is described in the
definition of the system.
The closeness of two systems S0 and S1 can be measured by introducing a so-called distinguisher.
A distinguisher D is itself a system and it has the same interfaces as the system S0, with the only
difference that wherever S0 takes an input, D gives an output and vice versa. In addition, D has
an extra output. The distinguisher D has access to all interfaces of S0, even though these interfaces
might not be in the same location when the protocol is executed (for example, one of the interfaces
might be the one seen by Alice, while the other is the one seen by Eve).
8 We will write U for the random bit denoting Alice’s input, bold-face letters U will denote a n-bit random variable
(i.e., an n-bit vector), Ui a single random bit in this n-bit string and lowercase letters the value that the random
variable has taken. A similar notation is used for Alice’s output X and Bob’s input and output V and Y . No
assumption is made about the range of Eve’s input/output variables W and Z.
St
Fig. 8. A system.
B
∈ {0, 1}
D
S0
t
B
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t
Fig. 9. The distinguisher
Now consider the following game: the distinguisher D is given one out of two systems at random
— either S0 or S1 — but the distinguisher does not know which one. It then has to interact with
the system and output a bit B at the end, guessing which system it has interacted with. The distin-
guishing advantage between system S0 and S1 is the maximum guessing advantage any distinguisher
can have in this game (see Figure 9).
Definition 4. The distinguishing advantage between two systems S0 and S1 is
δ(S0,S1) = maxD
[P (B = 1|S = S0)− P (B = 1|S = S1)].
Two systems S0 and S1 are called ǫ-indistinguishable if δ(S0,S1) ≤ ǫ.
The probability of any event E when the distinguisher D is interacting with S0 or S1 cannot
differ by more than this quantity.
Lemma 4. Assume two ǫ-indistinguishable systems S0 and S1. Denote by P (E|S0,D) the probability
of an event E, defined by any of the input and output variables, given the distinguisher D is interacting
with the system S0. Then
P (E|S0,D) ≤ P (E|S1,D) + ǫ
Proof. Assume P (E|S0,D) > P (E|S1,D) + ǫ and define the distinguisher D such that it outputs
B = 0 whenever the event E has happened and whenever E has not happened it outputs B = 1.
Then this distinguisher reaches a distinguishing advantage of δ(S0,S1) > ǫ contradicting the as-
sumption that the two systems are ǫ-indistinguishable. 
3.2 Security of a Key
The security of a cryptographic primitive can be measured by the distance of this system from an
ideal system, which is secure by definition. For example, in the case of key distribution the ideal
system is the one which outputs a uniform and random key (bit string) at one end and for which all
other input/output interfaces are completely independent of this first interface. This key is secure
by construction. If the real key distribution protocol is ǫ-indistinguishable from the ideal one, then
by Lemma 4 the key obtained from the real system needs to be secure except with probability ǫ.
This is because the probability that an adversary has knowledge about the key is 0 in the ideal case.
S× Sideal
S
Sreal
Fig. 10. The real and ideal system for the case of key distribution.
Definition 5. A key S is ǫ-secure if the system outputting S is ǫ-indistinguishable from an ideal
system which outputs a uniform random variable S and for which all other input/output interfaces
are completely independent of the random variable S.
This definition implies that the resulting security is universally composable [39,4,15]. In fact,
assume by contradiction that there exists any way of using the key (or any other part of the system
which generates the key) such that the result is insecure, i.e., distinguishable with probability larger
than ǫ from the ideal system. This process could then be used to distinguish the key generation
scheme from an ideal one with probability larger than ǫ, which is impossible by definition.
3.3 Security of Our Key Agreement Protocol
The system we consider (see Figure 11) is the one where Alice and Bob share a public authenticated
channel plus a quantum state (modeled as a box). Eve can wire-tap the public channel and choose
an input on her part of the box and obtain an output (i.e., measure her part of the quantum
state). Similar to the quantum case, it is no advantage for Eve to make several box partitions
(measurements) instead of a single one, as the same information can be obtained by making a
refined box partition of the initial box. Without loss of generality, we can, therefore, assume that
Eve gives a single input at the end (after all communication between Alice and Bob is finished). In
our scenario, Eve, therefore, obtains all the communication exchanged over the public channel Q,
can then choose the input to her box W (which can depend on Q) and finally obtains the outcome
of the box Z. If Alice and Bob apply a protocol π to the inputs and outputs of their boxes and the
public channel
X
U
Y
V
W Z
quantum state
ψ
Q
pi pi
SA SB
Fig. 11. Our system. Alice and Bob share a public authentic channel and a quantum state. When
they apply a protocol π to obtain a key, all this can together be modeled as a system.
information exchanged over the public channel to obtain a key, this protocol can also be included
in the system. The new system now outputs the key SA on Alice’s and SB on Bob’s side. Obviously
Eve’s possibilities to interact with this system has not changed. We will, therefore, need to bound
the distance between this system and the ideal system.9
9 Note that we can consider the distance of SA from an ideal key and the distance between SA and SB (probability
of the keys to be unequal) separately. By the triangle inequality, the distance of the total real system from the ideal
system is at most the sum of the two.
S Q W Z
Sreal
t
S Q W Z
× Sideal
t
Fig. 12. Our system. The distribution of the random variable S in the ideal case is such that
PS(s) = 1/|S|.
The following corollary is a direct consequence10 of the definitions of the systems in Figure 12
and the distinguishing advantage.
Corollary 1. Assume a key S generated by a system as given in Figure 12. Then
δ(Sreal,Sideal) = 1/2 ·
∑
s,q
max
w
∑
z
PZ,Q|W=w(z, q) · |PS|Z=z,Q=q,W=w(s)− PU |,
where w is chosen such as to maximize this quantity and PU := 1/|S|.
This quantity will be the one that is relevant for our security definition and because it corresponds
to the distance from uniform of the key from the eavesdropper’s point of view, we will in the
following call it the distance from uniform of S given Z(W ) and Q, where we write Z(W ) because the
eavesdropper can choose the input adaptively and the choice of input changes the output distribution.
Definition 6. The distance from uniform of S given Z(W ) and Q is
d(S|Z(W ), Q) = 1/2 ·
∑
s,q
max
w
∑
z
PZ,Q|W=w(z, q) · |PS|Z=z,Q=q,W=w(s)− PU | .
4 Secrecy from a Single Box
Let us take a closer look at the simple case where the protocol π directly takes the output of an
imperfect PR box as a key. More explicitly, Alice and Bob share an imperfect PR box — one that
fulfills P (X ⊕ Y = U · V ) = 1 − ε for uniform inputs. Alice and Bob use the box giving a random
input and obtain an output. Then they announce their inputs over the public authentic channel,
i.e., Q := (U = u, V = v).11 We will show in this section that Eve can get some knowledge about
Alice’s outcome X depending on ε, but the distance from uniform from her point of view is limited
by 2ε (assuming she gets to know the input).
Lemma 5. Assume a tripartite box PXY Z|UVW such that the marginal PXY |UV is a non-local box
with 1/4 ·
∑
x⊕y=u·v PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) = 1− ε and Q := (U = u, V = v). Then
d(X|Z(W ), Q) ≤ 2ε .
Proof. Consider w.l.o.g. the case X = 0. First we generalize the table from Section 1.4 to the
case where P (X ⊕ Y 6= U · V ) = ε on average (and it is not necessarily ε for every single in-
put). We call εi the probability not to fulfill the CHSH condition (X ⊕ Y 6= U · V ) for the inputs
10 For the formal proof it is useful to note that instead of a box taking input W , we can consider a box giving outputs
indexed by w, Zw , of which one is selected. This reflects that the box considered is non-signaling.
11 We will, in a certain abuse of notation, allow Q to consist of both random variables and events that a random
variable takes a given value. In case of such events {U = u}, this means that the distance from uniform will hold
given this specific value u, whereas taking the expectation over Q will correspond to taking the expectation over all
the “free” random variables contained in Q.
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} respectively. Suppose w.l.o.g. that the input was (0, 0), so X should be
maximally biased for this input.
u PX|U=u,V=v(0) PY |U=u,V=v(0) v
0 p p− ε1 0
0 p p− ε2 1
1 p− ε1 − ε3 p− ε1 0
1 p− ε1 − ε3 p− ε2 1
Because P [X ⊕ Y 6= U · V |U, V = 0, 0] = ε1, the bias of Y , given U = V = 0, must be at
least p − ε1. Because of non-signaling, X’s bias must be p as well when V = 1, and so on. Fi-
nally, P [X ⊕ Y 6= U · V |U, V = 1, 1] = ε4 implies p − ε2 − (1 − (p − ε1 − ε3)) ≤ ε4, hence,
p ≤ 1/2 + 1/2
∑
i εi = 1/2 + 2ε. Now consider a box partition of PXY |UV parametrized by z. Let εz
denote of the box given Z = z, i.e., εz = 1/4 ·
∑
i εi,z. Because this box must still be non-signaling,
the bias of X given Z = z, U = u and V = v is at most 2εz by the above argument. However,
because PXY |UV =
∑
z p
z · P zXY |UV , we also have ε =
∑
z p
z · εz and because this further holds for
all values of X, d(X|Z(W ), Q) ≤
∑
z p
z · 2εz = 2ε. 
Remark 1. Note that there exists a box partition which reaches this bound, and that can be found
through a straight-forward maximization. The explicit calculations are given in Appendix A.
Boxes PXY |UV that approximate a PR box with error ε ∈ [0, 0.25) are non-local. We see that for any
non-local box, Eve cannot obtain perfect knowledge about Alice’s output bit, and the box, therefore,
contains some secrecy.
5 Privacy Amplification
In the following, we consider the case where Alice and Bob share n imperfect PR boxes and the
key is obtained by taking the XOR of all n output bits. We will show in this section, that taking
the XOR of the outputs of several boxes is a good privacy amplification function. At first, we will
assume that the boxes as seen by Alice and Bob are n independent and unbiased (i.e., for all inputs,
the outputs X and Y are equally likely to be 0 or 1) boxes each with an associated error εi (which
is the same for all inputs). Then, we will show that this also holds for the case when Alice and Bob
share a convex combination of independent unbiased boxes. Indeed, Alice and Bob can apply a local
mapping to their inputs and outputs to obtain a marginal box that is the convex combination of
several independent and unbiased boxes and, therefore, enforce this situation [30,31]. The details of
this local mapping — called depolarization — are described in Appendix E. Finally, we completely
remove the criterion of independence and show that the distance from uniform of the XOR of the
outcomes of any (2n + 1)-non-signaling system having binary inputs and outputs cannot be larger
than what could be obtained from its “depolarized” version.
The main result of this section will be the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Assume a (2n+1)-partite box PXYZ|UVW such that the marginal PXY|UV corresponds to
n independent and unbiased non-local boxes each with an associated error εi. Assume f(X) :=
⊕
iXi
and Q := (U = u,V = v, F =
⊕
). Then
d(f(X)|Z(W ), Q) ≤ 1/2 ·
∏
i
(4εi) (≤ 1/2 · (4ε)
n) , (3)
where ε = 1n
∑
i εi.
Note that this value can easily be reached by attacking each box independently, such as given in
Appendix A, and this bound is, therefore, tight.
For the proof of Lemma 6 we will proceed in several steps. First, we show that the problem of
finding the maximum distance from uniform of the XOR of several output bits can be cast as a
linear optimization problem. Then, we show that this linear program describing n boxes can be seen
as the n-wise tensor product of the linear program describing a single box — this is the crucial step.
By using the product form of the linear program we can then show that there exists a dual feasible
solution — i.e., an upper-bound on the distance from uniform — reaching the above value.
First we note that the maximal possible non-uniformity of the XOR of the output bits can be
obtained by a box partition with only two outputs, 0 and 1.
Lemma 7. Assume there exists a box partition with d(
⊕
iXi|Z
′(W ), Q). Then there exists a box
partition with the same distance from uniform with Z ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. Assume that the box partition has more than two elements. Define two new elements
(pZ=0, PZ=0
XY|UV) by
pZ=0 := pz
′
1 + · · · + pz
′
m
PZ=0XY|UV :=
1
pz1
m∑
i=1
pz
′
iP
z′i
XY|UV,
where the set z′1, . . . , z
′
m is defined to consist of the boxes such that P [
⊕
iXi = 0|Z = z
′
i] > 1/2.
Similarly define (pZ=1, PZ=1
XY|UV) as the convex combination of the remaining elements of the box
partition. Because the spaces of boxes is convex, this forms again a valid box partition and it has
the same distance. 
It is, therefore, sufficient to consider a box partition with only two elements z = 0 and z = 1.
However, given one element of the box partition (p, PZ=0
XY|UV), the second element (1 − p, P
Z=1
XY|UV)
is determined, because their convex combination forms the marginal box, PXY|UV.
Lemma 8. Assume a box partition w¯ with element (p, PZ=0
XY|UV) and an unbiased bit S = f(X) such
that w.l.o.g. P [S = 0|Z = 0, Q] ≥ 1/2. Then the distance from uniform of S given the box partition
w¯ and Q = (U = u,V = v, F = f) is
d(S|Z(w¯), Q) = 2 · p · (P [S = 0|Z = 0, Q]− 1/2) .
Proof.
d(S|Z(w¯), Q) = p · (P [S = 0|Z = 0, Q]− 1/2)
+(1− p) · (−1)(
1/2 − p · P [S = 0|Z = 0, Q]
1− p
− 1/2)
= 2 · p · (P [S = 0|Z = 0, Q]− 1/2) .

The above lemmas imply that finding the distance from uniform is equivalent to finding the “best”
element of a box partition (p, PZ=0
XY|UV). When can (p, P
Z=0
XY|UV) be element of a box partition? The
criterion is given in Lemma 9.
Lemma 9. Given a box PXY|UV, there exists a box partition with element (p, PZ=0XY|UV) if and only
if for all inputs and outputs x,y,u, v,
p · PZ=0XY|UV(xy|uv) ≤ PXY|UV(xy|uv) . (4)
Proof. The non-signaling condition is linear and the space of conditional probability distributions is
convex, therefore a convex combination of valid boxes PZ=z
XY|UV is again a valid box. To prove that
the outcome z = 0 can occur with probability p it is, therefore, sufficient to show that there exists
another valid outcome z = 1 which can occur with 1 − p, and that the weighted sum of the two is
PXY|UV. If PZ=0XY|UV is a normalized and non-signaling probability distribution, then so is P
Z=1
XY|UV,
because the sum of the two, PXY|UV, is also non-signaling and normalized. Therefore, we only need
to verify that all entries of the complementary box PZ=1
XY|UV are between 0 and 1. However, this box
is the difference
PZ=1XY|UV =
1
1− p
(PXY|UV − p · PZ=0XY|UV) .
Requesting this to be greater or equal to 0 is equivalent to (4). We observe that all entries of PZ=1
XY|UV
are now trivially smaller than or equal to 1 because of the normalization: if the sum of positive sum-
mands is 1, each of them can be at most 1. 
We can now show that the maximal distance from uniform which can be reached by a non-
signaling adversary is the solution of a linear programming problem (see Appendix B for details on
linear programming).12 We introduce a new variable ∆, which is a vector such that with each value
of x,y,u,v, we can associate an entry of ∆ and we write ∆(x,y|u,v) for this entry. ∆ can be seen
as a probability distribution describing a box, where the distribution need not be normalized nor
positive.
Lemma 10. The distance from uniform of
⊕
iXi given Z(W ) and Q := (U = u,V = v, F =
⊕
)
is
d(
⊕
i
Xi|Z(W ), Q) = 1/2 · b
T ·∆∗ ,
where bT ·∆∗ is the optimal value of the linear program
max:
∑
(x,y):f(x)=0
∆(xy|uv)−
∑
(x,y):f(x)=1
∆(xy|uv) (5)
s.t.:
∑
x
∆(xy|uv)−
∑
x
∆(xy|u’v) = 0 ∀y, v,u,u’ (non-signaling from Alice to Bob)
∑
y
∆(xy|uv)−
∑
y
∆(xy|uv’) = 0 ∀x,u, v, v’ (non-signaling from Bob to Alice)
∆(xy|uv) ≤ P (xy|uv) ∀x,y,u, v
∆(xy|uv) ≥ −P (xy|uv) ∀x,y,u, v
Proof. We show that every element of a box partition (p, PZ=0
XY|UV) corresponds to a feasible ∆ and
vice versa.
Assume an element of a box partition (p, PZ=0
XY|UV) and define
∆(xy|uv) = 2p · PZ=0(xy|uv)− P (xy|uv) .
∆ fulfills the non-signaling conditions by linearity. Further p ≥ 0 and PZ=0(xy|uv) ≥ 0 imply
∆(xy|uv) ≥ −P (xy|uv) and p · PZ=0(xy|uv) ≤ P (xy|uv) implies ∆(xy|uv) ≤ P (xy|uv). ∆ is,
therefore, feasible.
To see the reverse direction, assume a feasible ∆. Define
p = 1/2 · (1 +
∑
xy
∆(xy|0 . . . 00 . . . 0))
PZ=0(xy|uv) =
P (xy|uv) +∆(xy|uv)
2p
.
(For completeness, define PZ=0(xy|uv) = P (xy|uv) in case p = 0.) To see that (p, PZ=0
XY|UV) is
element of a box partition note that
∑
xy∆(xy|0 . . . 00 . . . 0) =
∑
xy∆(xy|u’v’) for all u’,v’ because
12 In the following we drop the indices of the probability distributions as they should be clear from the context.
of the non-signaling constraints. I.e., p is independent of the chosen input and the transformation
is, therefore, linear. This implies that PZ=0 is still non-signaling. Because
∑
xy
PZ=0(xy|uv) =
∑
xy
P (xy|uv) +∆(xy|uv)
2p
=
1 + (2p − 1)
2p
= 1
it is normalized. Because −P (xy|uv) ≤ ∆(xy|uv) ≤ P (xy|uv) and
∑
xy P (xy|uv) = 1, we have
−1 ≤
∑
xy∆(xy|0 . . . 00 . . . 0) ≤ 1 and this implies P
Z=0(xy|uv) ≥ 0 i.e., PZ=0
XY|UV is a box. By
Lemma 9, (p, PZ=0
XY|UV) is element of a box partition because
p · PZ=0(xy|uv) = 1/2 · (1 +
∑
xy
∆(xy|0 . . . 00 . . . 0)) ·
P (xy|uv) +∆(xy|uv)
1 +
∑
xy∆(xy|0 . . . 00 . . . 0)
= 1/2 · (P (xy|uv) +∆(xy|uv)) ≤ P (xy|uv) .
Finally, we show that the value of the objective function for any ∆ is exactly twice the distance from
uniform reached by the box partition with element (p, PZ=0
XY|UV):
∑
(x,y):f(x)=0
∆(xy|uv)−
∑
(x,y):f(x)=1
∆(xy|uv)
=
∑
(x,y):f(x)=0
(
2p · PZ=0(xy|uv)− P (xy|uv)
)
−
∑
(x,y):f(x)=1
(
2p · PZ=0(xy|uv)− P (xy|uv)
)
= 2p ·

 ∑
(x,y):f(x)=0
PZ=0(xy|uv)−
∑
(x,y):f(x)=1
PZ=0(xy|uv)


= 2 · 2p(P [f(X) = 0|Z = 0, Q]− 1/2) ,
which is exactly twice the distance from uniform by Lemma 8. 
We know that there exists a feasible ∆ which reaches a value of
∏
i(4εi), namely the ∆ associated
with the box partition corresponding to an individual attack. We now want to show that this value is
also dual feasible and, therefore, optimal. First, we re-write the primal in a form with only inequality
constraints and no equality constraints. To do so, we replace constraints of the form aj ·∆ = 0 by
the two constraints aj ·∆ ≤ 0 and −aj ·∆ ≤ 0. We obtain:
max: bT ·∆
s.t.: A ·∆ ≤ c and its dual
min: cTλ
s.t.: AT · λ = b
λ ≥ 0
(6)
The explicit values of A, b, c and the dual optimal solution λ∗ for the case of a single box are given
in Appendix C. Note that in the dual program, the marginal box as seen by Alice and Bob only
appears in the objective function. The feasible region is, therefore, completely independent of the
marginal.
Our main tool to show optimality will be to show that we can express the linear program
describing n boxes as the tensor product of the linear program describing one box.
Lemma 11. Assume A1, b1, c1 are the vectors and matrices associated with the linear program (6)
for the case of a single box. Then the value of the program A, b, c associated with n boxes is equal to
the value of the linear program defined by13
max: (b⊗n1 )
T ·∆ (7)
s.t.: A⊗n1 ·∆ ≤ c
⊗n
1 .
13 We write here c1 for each of the n boxes for notational simplicity. However, the marginal box ci could actually be
different for each of the n
Proof. We describe the case n = 2, the case of larger n is analogue. First note that with each entry
of ∆ for a single box there are associated input and output bits Xi, Yi, Ui, Vi. With each entry of ∆
living in the tensor product space of two boxes, we can associate an entry X,Y,U,V corresponding
to two bits each in the obvious way.
b1 is such that the entries associated with X1 = 0, U1 = 0, V1 = 0 is 1; X1 = 1, U1 = 0, V1 = 0 is −1
and for all other inputs it is zero (the choice of input 0, 0 is arbitrary and no restriction). b1 ⊗ b1 is,
therefore, such that for
⊕
iXi = 0,U = 00,V = 00 it is 1; for
⊕
iXi = 1,U = 00,V = 00 it is −1
and for all other inputs it is 0. This is exactly the form that gives us the bias of the XOR of two
output bits given input U,V = 00, 00.
Now let us see that A and c can also be taken of tensor product form. Indeed, we will show that the
constraints given by A⊗n1 and c
⊗n
1 are either exactly the ones that describe a 2n non-signaling box or
they are trivially fulfilled and, therefore, do not modify the value of the linear program. We can divide
the lines of A into 4 types, we call them An−s (for “non-signaling”), −An−s (which contains the same
coefficients as An−s but with the sign reversed), 116×16 and −116×16 (which contains a 1 resp. −1 at
a certain position and 0 everywhere else) (compare with Appendix C). The entries of c associated
with these types are respectively 0, 0, P (xy|uv) and P (xy|uv) (the marginal probabilities).
Now consider A⊗21 and c
⊗2
1 . We now have 16 types of rows, corresponding to all possible combinations.
1. Type 116×16 ⊗ 116×16 = 1256×256 The associated c is P (x1y1|u1v1) · P (x2y2|u2v2) (i.e., the prob-
ability entry of the two boxes) and these constraints correspond exactly to the upper bound on
∆ in the case of two boxes. (Type −116×16 ⊗ −116×16 = 1256×256 is exactly the same row and,
therefore, follows from this one).
2. Type −116×16 ⊗ 116×16 = −1256×256 The associated c is P (x1y1|u1v1) · P (x2y2|u2v2) and these
constraints correspond exactly to the lower bound on ∆ in the case of two boxes. (Type 116×16⊗
−116×16 = −1256×256 is exactly the same row and, therefore, follows from this one).
3. The lines of the form An−s ⊗ 116×16 correspond exactly to the non-signaling constraints for
two boxes. To see this assume that the non-signaling constraint on the first box is of the form∑
x1
P (x1, y1|u1, v1)−
∑
x1
P (x1, y1|u
′
1v1) and the identity on the second box is 1 at the position
x2, y2, v2, u2 and 0 everywhere else. Then the constraint A
n−s ⊗ 116×16 corresponds to∑
x1
P (x1, x2, y1, y2|u1, u2, v1, v2)−
∑
x1
P (x1, x2, y1, y2|u
′
1, u2, v1, v2)
and this is exactly the form of a 2n non-signaling constraint. The associated entry of c is, as
expected, 0 · P (x2, y2|u2, v2) = 0. Together with the constraints of the form 116×16 ⊗ An−s we
obtain all the non-signaling constraints for the two boxes. (Type −An−s ⊗ −116×16 is again
exactly the same row).
4. The lines of the form −An−s⊗116×16 and 116×16⊗−An−s give the same non-signaling constraints
as above but with reversed sign, therefore, enforcing the equality constraint by two inequality
constraints. (An−s ⊗ −116×16 and −116×16 ⊗ An−s are again exactly the same rows and are,
therefore, trivially fulfilled.)
5. Remain the lines of the form An−s ⊗ An−s. Their associated c is 0 · 0 = 0. However, the second
non-signaling constraints can be seen as a linear combination of the identity constraints, i.e.,
An−s ⊗ An−s = An−s ⊗ (
∑
k αk · 116×16,k). Because of the linearity of the tensor product in the
second component, this constraint is, therefore, the linear combination of the constraints given
in point 2 and 3 above and because each of them is equal to 0, their linear combination is also
equal to 0 and this constraint is, therefore, trivially fulfilled whenever the above constraints are.
The same argument holds for the rows −An−s ⊗An−s, An−s ⊗−An−s and −An−s ⊗−An−s.

Now we consider the dual program of (7). Using Lemma 11 we see that if λ1 is a feasible dual solution
for a single box, then λ⊗n1 is feasible for n boxes.
Lemma 12. For any λi which is dual feasible for the linear program A1, b1 associated with one box,⊗
i λi is dual feasible for the linear program (7) associated with n boxes. Further, this dual feasible
solution has value cTnλn =
∏
i(c
T
i λi).
Proof. λi is dual feasible for A1, b1, i.e., A
T
1 λ1 = b1 and λ1 ≥ 0. Then
ATnλn = (A
⊗n
1 )
T (
⊗
i
λi) = (A
T
1 )
⊗n(
⊗
i
λi) =
⊗
i
(AT1 λi) = (b1)
⊗n
and
⊗
i(λi) ≥ 0, i.e., λn =
⊗
i λi is dual feasible. Its value is cnλn =
⊗
i ci ·
⊗
i λi =
⊗
i(ciλi) =∏
i(ciλi). 
Now we are ready to give the proof of Lemma 6.
Proof (of Lemma 6). For a single box d(X|Z(W ), Q) ≤ 1/2 · (4εi) by Lemma 5 (see Section 4), this
implies that there exists a dual feasible λi, such that c
T
i λi ≤ 4εi for each i. By Lemma 12, there
exists a dual feasible λn such that c
T
nλn ≤
∏
i(4εi) ≤ (4ε)
n and, therefore, by Lemma 10,
d(
⊕
i
Xi|Z(W ), Q) = 1/2 · c
T
nλ
∗
n ≤ 1/2 · c
T
nλn = 1/2 ·
∏
i
(4εi) ≤ 1/2 · (4ε)
n .

This implies that if Alice and Bob create a single key bit by applying the XOR to their outputs
there is no advantage for Eve to do a collective or coherent attack, as the above distance from
uniform can be reached by an individual attack.14
We now want to remove the condition that the marginal boxes of Alice and Bob need to be
independent. First we consider the case when Alice and Bob share the convex combination of n
independent and unbiased boxes of different errors. The reason to consider this case is because no
matter what boxes Alice and Bob share — they can be arbitrarily correlated — Alice and Bob can
apply a random mapping to their input and output bits (see Appendix E), such that the distribution
they share after this mapping in fact is the one of a convex combination of several independent and
unbiased boxes with different errors [30,31]. The statement of Lemma 6 still holds here:
Lemma 13. Assume a (2n+1)-partite box PXYZ|UVW such that the marginal PXY|UV corresponds
to a convex combination with weight pj of n unbiased non-local boxes each with an associated error
εji . Assume f(X) :=
⊕
iXi and Q := (U = u,V = v, F =
⊕
). Then d(f(X)|Z(W ), Q) ≤
∑
j pj ·[
1/2 ·
∏
i(4ε
j
i )
]
.
Proof. Note that for a single box the dual optimal solution is λ∗1 for all c1 describing a single box
(i.e., cT1 · λ
∗
1 = 4ε for all c1) (see Appendix C). For n boxes, λ
⊗n
1 is still dual feasible. It reaches a
value of cTnλ
⊗n
1 =
(∑
j pj(⊗ic
j
i )
)
· (λ1)
⊗n =
∑
j pj
∏
i(4ε
j
i ). 
Now we want to remove any requirement of independence. Lemma 14 states that choosing boxes
which are not independent cannot be an advantage for Eve and the above bounds still hold.
Lemma 14. Assume a (2n+1)-partite box PXYZ|UVW with any marginal PXY|UV. Assume f(X) :=⊕
iXi and Q := (U = u,V = v, F =
⊕
) and the distance from uniform d(f(X)|Z(W ), Q).
Now assume a second (2n + 1)-partite box with marginal P ′
XY|UV obtained from PXY|UV by de-
polarization and with distance from uniform d′(f(X)|Z(W ), Q) (with the same Q and f). Then
d(f(X)|Z(W ), Q) ≤ d′(f(X)|Z(W ), Q).
Proof. We know that for P ′
XY|UV, d
′(f(X)|Z(W ), Q) =
∑
j pj · 1/2 ·
∏
i(4ε
j
i ) by Lemma 13 and
because this bound can easily be reached by attacking each box separately. However, this value is
exactly the sum of all probabilities where none of the CHSH conditions are fulfilled (i.e., where
Xi ⊕ Yi 6= Ui · Vi for all i).
Now consider PXY|UV. P ′XY|UV can be seen as the convex combination of all the PXY|UV to which
14 Note that individual attacks are optimal only in this specific case and, in general, they are strictly weaker than
collective or coherent attacks. We give an example of such a collective attack in Appendix F.
one of the mappings given in Appendix E has been applied. However, the distance from uniform
for PXY|UV (or their mappings) is limited by the sum of all probabilities where none of the CHSH
conditions are fulfilled and this holds for all values of the input u,v (in Appendix C, for each input
u,v a dual feasible solution reaching this value is given). By comparison with Appendix E, we see
that the mappings (for each input) leave
⊕
i xi unchanged (up to a relabeling between 0 and 1).
The mappings also leave the sum of probabilities where none of the CHSH conditions are fulfilled
unchanged, because x′i, y
′
i, u
′
i, v
′
i not fulfilling the CHSH condition are mapped to xi, yi, ui, vi not
fulfilling the CHSH condition. We conclude
d(f(X)|Z(W ), Q) ≤ λ∗ ⊗n1 · c =
∑
x,y,u,v:xi⊕yi 6=ui·vi ∀i
PXY|UV(xy|uv)
=
∑
x,y,u,v:xi⊕yi 6=ui·vi ∀i
P ′XY|UV(xy|uv) = d
′(f(X)|Z(W ), Q) .

6 Full Key Agreement
6.1 Privacy Amplification: From One to Several Bits
We have seen in the previous section that it is possible to create a highly secure bit using a linear
function — the XOR. But obviously we would like to extract a secure key instead of a single bit.
Alice and Bob will create all the key bits the same way: by applying a random linear function to
the output bits, i.e., S := A⊙X, where A is a s× n-matrix over GF (2) with p(0) = p(1) = 1/2 for
all entries and we write ⊙ for the multiplication modulo 2. Let us now see why this key is secure.
First, we reduce the security of the key S to the question of the security of every single bit.
Lemma 15. Assume S := [S1, . . . , Ss], where Si are bits. Then
d(S|Z(W ), Q) ≤
∑
i
d(Si|Z(W ), Q, S1, . . . , Si−1) . (8)
Proof.
d(S|Z(W ), Q) =
∑
s,q
max
w
∑
z
|PS,Z,Q|W=w(s, z, q)−
1
2s
· PZ,Q|W=w(z, q)|
≤
∑
s,q
max
w
∑
z
[
|PS,Z,Q|W=w(s, z, q)−
1
2
· PS1...Ss−1,Z,Q|W=w(s1, . . . , ss1 , z, q)|
+ . . .+
1
2s−1
|PS1,Z,Q|W=w(s1, z, q) −
1
2
· PZ,Q|W=w(z, q)|
]
≤
∑
i
d(Si|Z(W ), Q, S1, . . . , Si−1) ,
where the first equation is by the definition of the distance from uniform and the second inequality
is by the triangle inequality. 
We now need to bound the distance from uniform of the i’th key bit given all previous bits.
Lemma 16. Assume S := A ⊙X, where A is a i × n-matrix over GF (2) and be PA the uniform
distribution over all these matrices. Q := (U = u,V = v, A). Then
d(Si|Z(W ), Q, S1, . . . , Si−1) ≤ 1/2 · 2i−1 ·
(
1 + 4ε
2
)n
. (9)
Proof. Bounding the distance from uniform of Si given S1, . . . , Si−1 corresponds to bounding the dis-
tance from uniform of Si given all linear combinations over GF (2) of S1, . . . , Si−1 (see Appendix G.2).
For each linear combination
⊕
j∈I Sj define the random bit Sc = c ⊙ X where c =
⊕
j∈I aj ⊕ ai
and aj denotes the jth line of the matrix A. Note that Sc is a random linear function over X (the
proof of this is given in Appendix G.3). If Sc is uniform and independent of S1, . . . , Si−1, then Si is
uniform given this specific linear combination. However, the distance from uniform and independent
of Sc is given by Lemma 6 (note that Lemma 6 bounds not only the distance from uniform of Sc
given Z, but also given all Xi not included in Sc, as these could be included in the variable Z). We
obtain
d(c⊙X|Z(W ), Q) ≤ 1/2 ·
1
2n
∑
K⊆n
∏
i∈K
(4εi) ≤ 1/2 ·
1
2n
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
(4ε)k = 1/2 ·
(
1 + 4ε
2
)n
,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that this expression is maximized when all εi are
equal (see Appendix G.4 for a proof of this). If a random variable S has distance from uniform at
most d, then we can define an event E occuring with probability at least 1− d such that given E , S
is uniform. By the union bound over all 2i−1 possible linear combinations of S1, . . . , Si−1, we obtain
the probability that Si is uniform given S1, . . . , Si−1 and, therefore, the bound on the distance from
uniform
d(Si|Z(W ), Q, S1, . . . , Si−1) ≤ 1/2 · 2i ·
(
1 + 4ε
2
)n
. (10)

Now we can bound the distance from uniform of a key S := S1 . . . Ss by Lemma 15 and 16.
Lemma 17. Assume S := A ⊙X, where A is a s × n-matrix over GF (2) and be PA the uniform
distribution over all these matrices. Q := (U = u,V = v, A). Then
d(S|Z(W ), Q) ≤ 1/2 · 2s ·
(
1 + 4ε
2
)n
. (11)
Proof. By Lemma 15 and 16
d(S|Z(W ), Q) ≤ 1/2 ·
(
1 + 4ε
2
)n
· (
s∑
i=1
2i−1) ≤ 1/2 ·
(
1 + 4ε
2
)n
· (
2s − 1
2− 1
) ≤ 1/2 · 2s ·
(
1 + 4ε
2
)n
,
where the second inequality follows from the expression for geometric series. 
6.2 Information Reconciliation
In general, the outputs x and y of Alice and Bob are not equal but have a certain probability to
differ. Alice and Bob, therefore, need to do information reconciliation. They can do this the same
way they create the key, namely by using a random linear code. This follows directly from a result
from [16] about two-universal sets of hash functions and from a result from [14] about information
reconciliation. We restate the theorems below.
Theorem 1 ([16]). The set of functions fA(x) := A⊙x, where A is any n×m-matrix over GF (2)
is two-universal.
Theorem 2 ([14]). Suppose an n-bit string x another n-bit string y obtained by sending x over
a binary symmetric channel with error parameter δ. Assume the function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is
chosen at random amongst a set of two-universal functions. Choose y’ such that dH(y,y’) is minimal
among all strings r with f(r) = f(x). Then Px6=y’ ≤ 1− e−2
n·h(δ+ǫ)−m
+ (log n)
2ε(1−δ)
n .
The above theorems show that in the limit of large n, m = ⌈n · h(δ)⌉ (where δ is the probability
that Bob’s bit is different from Alice’s and h the binary entropy function), is both necessary and
sufficient for Bob to correct the errors in his raw key, i.e., the protocol is ǫ′-correct for any ǫ′ > 0.
If Alice and Bob communicate m bits during the information reconciliation phase, then the
security of the key after information reconciliation can be calculated by replacing in Lemma 17 the
length of the key by the length of the key plus information reconciliation, i.e., s 7→ s +m and we
obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 18. Assume [S,R] := A⊙X,where A is a (s +m)× n-matrix over GF (2) and be PA the
uniform distribution over all these matrices. Q := (U = u,V = v, A). Then
d(S|Z(W ), Q,R) ≤ 1/2 · 2s+m ·
(
1 + 4ε
2
)n
. (12)
6.3 Key Rate
The key rate is the length of the key divided by the number of boxes used in the limit of a large
number of boxes. Because we only need a small number of boxes for parameter estimation (see
Appendix D), this will asymptotically correspond to q := s/n. From Lemma 18, we can calculate
the key rate by setting m := h(δ) · n (see also Protocol 1 in Section 6.5 for a detailed description of
the protocol).
Lemma 19. The protocol reaches a key rate q of
q = 1− h(δ) − log2(1 + 4ε). (13)
Proof. From Lemma 18 and by the definition of the key rate, we can see that the protocol reaches
a key rate q if
2h(δ) · 2q ·
1 + 4ε
2
< 1.

Corollary 2 states for which parameters key agreement is possible (see Figure 4).
Corollary 2. The protocol reaches a positive key rate if ε < 2−h(δ)−1 − 1/4.
If the boxes have the same error for all inputs (δ = ε) then m := n · h(ε) and the protocol
does not reach a positive secret key rate for ε = 1+
√
2
4 , the minimum value reachable by quantum
mechanics. To reach a positive key rate using quantum mechanics, Alice and Bob will, therefore,
need to use different boxes, as described in the next section.
6.4 The Quantum Regime
To get a positive key rate in the quantum regime, Alice and Bob use a box which gives highly
correlated output bits given input (0, 0) (see Figure 13) and generate their raw key only from these
outputs. 15 The parameter limiting Eve’s knowledge is then still ε = 1/4·
∑
x⊕y 6=u·v PXY |UV (x, y, u, v),
the parameter defining the amount of information reconciliation necessary is, however, the error in
the correlation given input (0, 0) (δ in Figure 13). Note that in a noiseless setting the distribution
described in black font can be achieved by measuring a singlet state (see Protocol 1 below). In
that case, Alice and Bob will have perfectly correlated bits (and therefore would not need to do
any information reconciliation), and the parameter limiting Eve’s knowledge is ε = 0.1875. The
parameters δ and ǫ (in light gray font in Figure 13) are introduced to account for the noise in the
state and/or measurement.
15 Another way to reach a positive key rate in the quantum regime is to use a type of non-locality characterized by a
different Bell inequality allowing for a higher violation in the quantum regime. See [29] for details.
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Fig. 13. The quantum box used for key agreement.
6.5 The Protocol
In the following we give a detailed description of our key agreement protocol.
Protocol 1.
1. Alice creates n+ k maximally entangled states |Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉), for some k = Θ(n), and
sends one Qbit of every state to Bob.
2. Alice and Bob randomly measure the i’th system in either the basis U0 or U1 (for Alice) or V0
and V1 (Bob); the four bases are shown in Figure 14. All the 2(n + k) measurement events are
pairwise space-like separated.
3. They randomly choose n of the measurement results when both measured U0, V0 to form the raw
key.
4. For the remaining k measurements they announce the results over the public authenticated chan-
nel and estimate the parameters ε and δ (see Appendix D). They also check whether they have
obtained roughly the same number of 1’s and 0’s (for the information reconciliation scheme). If
the parameters are such that key agreement is possible (Figure 4) they continue; otherwise they
abort.
5. Information reconciliation and privacy amplification: Alice randomly chooses a (m+s)×n-matrix
A such that p(0) = p(1) = 1/2 for all entries and m := ⌈n · h(δ)⌉. She calculates A⊙ x (where x
is Alice’s raw key) and sends the first m bits to Bob over the public authenticated channel. The
remaining bits form the key.
30◦
30◦
U0
U1
V0
V1
Fig. 14. Alice’s and Bob’s measurement bases in terms of polarization.
Lemma 18 and 19 imply that this protocol allows for secure key agreement, as stated in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3. Protocol 1 achieves a positive secret-key-generation rate as soon as the parameter
estimation shows an approximation of PR boxes with an accuracy exceeding 80% and a correlation
of the outputs on input (0, 0) higher than 98%. There exists an event A with probability Prob [A] =
2−Ω(n) such that given A does not occur and the protocol is not aborted, then Alice and Bob share a
common key that is perfectly secret, where this secrecy is based solely on the non-signaling condition.
The above protocol also allows for traditional entanglement-based quantum key agreement [20].
Therefore, we have the following.
Corollary 3. Protocol 1 allows for efficient information-theoretic key agreement if quantum OR
relativity theory is correct.
7 Concluding Remarks and Open Questions
We propose a new efficient protocol for generating a secret key between two parties connected by
a quantum channel whose security is guaranteed solely by the fact that the measured correlations
violate a Bell inequality. Quantum mechanics guarantees the protocol to work, i.e., the required
correlations to occur. But the security proof is completely independent of quantum mechanics, once
the non-local correlations are established and have been verified by the legitimate partners.
The practical relevance of this fact is that the resulting security is device-independent : We could
even use devices manufactured by the adversary to do key agreement. The theoretical relevance is
that the resulting protocol is secure if either relativity or quantum theory is correct. This is in the
spirit of modern cryptography’s quest to minimize assumptions under which security can be proven.
Our scheme requires space-like separation not only between events happening on Alice’s and
Bob’s side, but also between events in the same laboratory. It is a natural open question whether
the space-like-separation conditions can be relaxed. For instance, is it sufficient if they hold on one
of the two sides? Or in one direction among the n events on each side? Obviously, the latter would
be very easy to guarantee in practice.
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Appendix
A Best Box Partition of a Single Box
In this section, we show that the bound derived in Lemma 5 is tight.
Lemma 20. Assume a box PXY Z|UVW such that the marginal PXY |UV is a non-local box with 1/4 ·∑
x⊕y=u·v PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) = 1 − ε and ε ≤ 0.25. Then there exists a box partition w such that
knowing the inputs, Z gives binary erasure information about X and P (Z ∈ {0, 1}) = 4ε. This box
partition reaches
d(X|Z(W ), Q) = 1/2 · 4ε
for Q := (U = u, V = v).
Proof. The proof is the following box partition:
❍
❍
❍V
U
0 1
❍
❍
❍Y
X
0 1 0 1
0
0 a1 a2 b1 b2
1 a2 a4 b3 b4
1
0 c1 c2 d1 d2
1 c3 c4 d3 d4
= a2 ·
0 1
0 1 0 1
0
0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
1
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
+ a3 ·
0 1
0 1 0 1
0
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1
1
0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
+ b2 ·
0 1
0 1 0 1
0
0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
1
0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
+ b3 ·
0 1
0 1 0 1
0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
1
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
(14)
+c2 ·
0 1
0 1 0 1
0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1
1
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
+ c3 ·
0 1
0 1 0 1
0
0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
1
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0
+ d1 ·
0 1
0 1 0 1
0
0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
1
0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
+ d4 ·
0 1
0 1 0 1
0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1
1
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1
+(1− a2 − a3 + b2 − b3 − c2 + c3 + d1 − d4) ·
0 1
0 1 0 1
0
0 1
2
0 1
2
0
1 0 1
2
0 1
2
1
0 1
2
0 0 1
2
1 0 1
2
1
2
0
,
To see that (14) indeed defines a box partition, notice that the parameters a2, a3, b2, b3, c2, c3,
d1, d4 (the ones for which the CHSH condition is not fulfilled, i.e., x⊕ y 6= u · v) fully characterize
any box. By the normalization (
∑
i ai = 1; and similar for b, c and d) and non-signaling condition
(a1 + a2 = b1 + b2; and similar for the other rows and columns) we can express a1 as
a1 =
1
2
· (1− a2 − a3 + b2 − b3 − c2 + c3 + d1 − d4).
This shows that the right-hand side and left-hand side of the equation are indeed equal. Because we
assumed 4ε ≤ 1, the above decomposition represents a convex combination of several boxes and is,
therefore, itself a box.
With probability a2 − a3 + b2 − b3 − c2 + c3 + d1 − d4 = 4ε, Z is such that P
z
XY |UV is local
deterministic (i.e., X (Y ) is a deterministic function of U (V )), in which case knowing U = u and
V = v, Z gives perfect information about X (Z ∈ {0, 1}). With probability 1 − 4ε Z is such that
P zXY |UV is a perfect non-local box in which case Z cannot give any information about X by the
non-signaling condition (Z = ⊥). 
B Linear Programming
In this section, we very briefly state the main facts about linear programming that we use for our
argument. See, for example, [13] for a more detailed introduction.
A linear program is an optimization problem with a linear objective function and linear inequality
(and equality) constraints, i.e., it can be expressed as
max: bT · x
s.t. A · x ≤ c ,
where x is the variable we want to optimize. An x which fulfills the constraints is called feasible. The
set of feasible x is convex, more precisely, a convex polyhedron, that is, a convex set with a finite
number of extremal points (vertices). A feasible x which maximizes the objective function bT · x,
is called optimal solution and is denoted by x∗. The value of bT · x∗, i.e., the maximal value of the
objective function is called optimal value and denoted by q∗. There is always a vertex at which the
optimal value is attained.
An important notion of linear programming is duality: the above linear program is called the primal
problem. From this linear program, another linear program can be derived, defined by
min: cT · λ
s.t. AT · λ = b
λ ≥ 0 ,
this problem is called the dual, its optimal solution is denoted by λ∗ and its optimal value by d∗.
The weak duality theorem says, that the value of the primal objective function for every feasible x
is smaller or equal to the value of the dual objective function for every feasible λ. The strong duality
theorem says that the two optimal values are equal, i.e., q∗ = d∗. It is therefore possible to solve a
linear program either by solving the linear program itself, or by solving its dual.
feasible region
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C Explicit Values of the Linear Program for a Single Box
In this section, we give the explicit expressions for the parameters of the linear program described
in Section 5 for the case of a single box.
For a single box, A, b, c have the values
A1 =


An−s1
−An−s1
116×16
−116×16

 with An−s1 =


1 1 −1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 −1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 −1 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 −1 −1
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 −1


c1 =


016
016
P (xy|uv)
P (xy|uv)

 b1 =


1
1
0
0
−1
−1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0


with P (xy|uv) =


P (00|00)
P (01|00)
P (00|01)
P (01|01)
P (10|00)
P (11|00)
P (10|01)
P (11|01)
P (00|10)
P (01|10)
P (00|11)
P (01|11)
P (10|10)
P (11|10)
P (10|11)
P (11|11)


and the dual optimal λ is
λ
∗T
1 =
(
0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
)
To obtain the value of the objective function (cT · λ∗1), the first part of λ
∗
1 will be multiplied by
0, i.e., does not contribute to the value. The second part is multiplied with PXY |UV . We can easily
see by comparison that for every x, y, u, v such that x⊕ y 6= u · v there is exactly one 1 in the second
part of λ∗1 and everywhere else λ∗1 is 0. I.e.,
cT · λ∗1 =
∑
x,y,u,v:x⊕y 6=u·v
PXY |UV (x, y, u, v)
The above values are for the input u, v = 0, 0. The optimal λ∗ reaching the same value for
different u, v are given below:
For u, v = 0, 1:
b
T
1 =
(
0 0 1 1 0 0 −1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
)
λ
∗T
1 =
(
0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
)
For u, v = 1, 0:
b
T
1 =
(
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 −1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
)
λ
∗T
1 =
(
0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
)
For u, v = 1, 1:
b
T
1 =
(
0 0 1 1 0 0 −1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
)
λ
∗T
1 =
(
0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
)
D Parameter Estimation
A crucial step of any quantum key distribution protocol is parameter estimation. Alice and Bob
need to test a small sample of the boxes they have received, to see whether they have received boxes
with the correct parameters. This can be done by classical sampling theory, as given in [27] (see
also [24]).
Lemma 21. [27],[24] Let Z be an n-tuple and Z ′ a k-tuple of random variables over a set Z, with
symmetric joint probability PZZ′. Let Qz′ be the relative frequency distribution of a fixed sequence
z′ and Q(z,z′) be the relative frequency distribution of a sequence (z, z′), drawn according to PZZ′.
Then for every ε ≥ 0 we have
PZZ′ [||Q(z,z′) −Qz′ || ≥ ε] ≤ |Z| · e
−kε2/8|Z|
In our case, we consider the case when Alice and Bob share n+ k boxes. After they have used the
boxes and announced the inputs, they randomly choose k of the boxes, for which they also uncover
the outputs. Call εmeas the fraction of those k boxes which x⊕ y 6= u · v. We call ε¯ the average error
of the remaining boxes. Then,
PS [||
n
n+ k
(ε¯− εmeas)|| ≥ ε] ≤ 2 · e
−kε2/16
PS [ε¯ ≥ εmeas(1 +
k
n
) · ε] ≤ 2 · e−kε
2/16
Obviously, Alice and Bob can also test other parameter such as δ — the correlation of their output
bits given input (0, 0) — in a similar way.
This means, if the boxes Eve has distributed are not good enough for key agreement, Alice and
Bob will most certainly detect this. If they are good enough, then Alice’s and Bob’s test will most
certainly be passed and key agreement is possible as discussed above.
E Depolarization
Assume Alice and Bob share an arbitrary distribution PXY|UV where X,Y,U,V is an n-bit string.
Then they can perform a sequence of local operations and public communication in order to obtain
a distribution which corresponds to the convex combination of n independent approximations of a
PR box with error εi. Further, each approximation of the PR box PXiYi|UiVi has unbiased outcomes
and the same error εi for all inputs. The local operations achieving this, are given in [30,31]. We
restate them here briefly: For each i, Alice and Bob choose the mapping independently in two steps.
First, with probability 1/2, they do either of the following:
1. nothing
2. both flip their outcome bits, i.e., xi → xi ⊕ 1 and yi → yi ⊕ 1 .
Then, with probability 1/4 each, they do either of the following:
1. nothing
2. xi → xi ⊕ ui and vi → vi ⊕ 1
3. ui → ui ⊕ 1 and yi → yi ⊕ vi
4. ui → ui ⊕ 1, xi → xi ⊕ ui ⊕ 1, vi → vi ⊕ 1 and yi → yi ⊕ vi .
The choice of local operation needs 3 random bits per box which have to be communicated from
Alice to Bob. Because, each of these operations conserves the probability of error εi a box with the
same error parameter — but now an unbiased one with the same error for all inputs — is obtained.
Furthermore, when this transformation is applied to each input/output bit of a distribution PXY |UV
taking n bits input and giving n bits output, a convex combination of products of independent and
unbiased approximations of PR boxes (with possibly different error εi) is obtained.
F Eve Can Always Know a Certain Fraction of Bits
Can Eve really do collective attacks which are better than individual ones? In this section we show
that this is indeed possible and give a collective attack for the case when Alice and Bob share n
boxes with error ε and such that the error is the same for all inputs.16 We show that for every value
of ε there exists an attack of Eve such that she knows with certainty a fraction of all the output
bits of Alice — an option unavailable if only individual attacks are allowed. What fraction Eve can
know depends on the value of ε.
16 In the following, we will only consider unbiased boxes with the same error for all inputs. The box is, therefore, fully
characterized by its error ε.
F.1 Example of a Better Collective Attack for Two Boxes
We first describe an example of an attack on two boxes. We will give an explicit strategy of Eve
(a box partition) which shows that she can know either one of the two bits with higher probability
than what can be done by an individual attack (although Eve cannot choose which one of the two
bits she will get to know). This shows that collective attacks are strictly stronger than individual
attacks. In fact, assume Alice will communicate to Bob the XOR of her two output bits in the
information reconciliation phase. In that case only the probability that Eve knows at least one of
the two bits is important, because together with the information of the XOR this immediately gives
her full information about both bits.
Before we can give the box partition, we need to proof the following Lemma.
Lemma 22. Every box with ε ∈ [1/4, 3/4] is local and can be expressed as the convex combination
of local deterministic boxes. We use the short-hand notation Lε for these local ε-boxes.
Proof. According to Lemma 20, a box with ε = 0.25 is local and can be expressed as convex com-
bination of local deterministic boxes. A local box with ε = 0.75 can be obtained from the one with
ε = 0.25 by flipping one of the output bits. Every box with ε ∈ (1/4, 3/4) can then be expressed as
a convex combination of the above boxes and is therefore local. 
We have already seen that if a box can be expressed as convex combination of local deterministic
boxes, then there exists a box partition (where the elements are exactly the local deterministic
boxes) such that knowing the inputs, the outputs are completely determined. CHSH-game with a
local box, we will now see that in our example the bad (local) strategies are important.
Eve’s strategy is given by Lemma 23. Note that the local boxes with the largest error play an
important role here. Eve’s outcome Z composed of two symbols, such that the first describes the
first box given outcome Z = z and the second symbol the second box. More precisely, we use zi = l
for an outcome given which box i is local and zi = ⊥ for an outcome given which box i is a PR box.
Lemma 23. Assume a (2 · 2 + 1)-partite non-signaling distribution PXYZ|UVW such that PXY|UV
corresponds to two independent boxes with P (Xi ⊕ Yi = Ui · Vi) = 1 − ε for all inputs and i = 1, 2.
Then the following is a box partition:
Z1Z2 p
z1z2 P z1z2X1Y1|U1V1 P
z1z2
X2Y2|U2V2
ll (4/3ε)2 Lε=3/4 Lε=3/4
l⊥ (4ε)(1 − 4/3ε) Lε=1/4 NL
⊥l (1− 4/3ε)(4ε) NL Lε=1/4
⊥⊥ 1− 2 · (4ε)(1 − 4/3ε) − (4/3ε)2 NL NL
(15)
and P z1z2
XY|UV := P
z1z2
X1Y1|U1V1 ·P
z1z2
X2Y2|U2V2 and where Lε stands for a box with error ε and NL for a PR
box.
Proof. To see that this defines a box partition, let us first see, that all boxes given outcome z are
non-signaling between all four input/output ends. This is obviously the case, because each of the
two boxes given outcome z is non-signaling and the double-box given outcome z is given by the
product of the two individual boxes.
Now let us see that the marginal is correct. For this, we need to verify that the distribution of the
output bits on each side is correct, but also that the probability that any subset of boxes fulfills
the CHSH condition needs to be correct. The first condition is fulfilled because all output bits are
uniform, independent and random even given outcome z. Now let us see that the probability to
fulfill/violate the CHSH condition is also correct. The probability that both boxes violate the CHSH
condition is given by the probability to obtain z1z2 = ll (both boxes are local) times the probability
that they then violate the CHSH condition. (If either of the boxes given outcome z is a non-local
box it never violates the CHSH condition, therefore no other outcomes z have to be considered.)
P (Xi ⊕ Yi 6= Ui · Vi for i = 1, 2) = p
ll · εz1z2=llbox 1 · ε
z1z2=ll
box 2 = (4/3ε)
2 · (3/4)2 = ε2 ,
where εzbox 1 denotes the error of the first box given outcome Z = z. Similarly, we can also show that
the probability of the first box violating the CHSH condition is correct:
P ((X1 ⊕ Y1 6= U1 · V1)) = p
{0,1}2 · εz1z2=llbox 1 + p
l⊥ · εz1z2=l⊥box 1
= (4/3ε)2 · (3/4) + (4ε)(1 − 4/3ε) · (1/4) = ε,
and the same for all other subsets of boxes. This shows that the marginal PXY|UV is unchanged by
this box partition. 
From this box partition, we directly obtain as a corollary:
Corollary 4. Assume a (2 · 2 + 1)-partite non-signaling distribution PXYZ|UVW such that PXY|UV
corresponds to two independent boxes with P (Xi ⊕ Yi = Ui · Vi) = 1 − ε for i = 1, 2. Then there
exists a box partition w such that the probability that Z gives binary erasure information (knowing
U = u,V = v) about at least one of the two output bits X1, X2 is (4ε)
2 + 2 · (4ε)(1 − 4/3ε).
This is larger than (4ε)2 + 2 · (4ε)(1 − 4ε), the value obtained by the best individual strategy.
F.2 Better Collective Attack for Any Number of Boxes and ε
We now give a generalization of the above strategy to attack two boxes to any number of boxes.
The attack obtains knowledge about a fraction of the output with certainty and independently of
the total number of boxes. Which fraction can be known depends on the error of the boxes.
Lemma 24. Assume a (2n + 1)-partite non-signaling distribution PXYZ|UVW such that PXY|UV
corresponds to n boxes with P (Xi ⊕ Yi = Ui · Vi) = 1 − ε for i = 1, . . . , n. Then the following is a
box partition:
Z pz P z
XY|UV
{z|♯l = i ∈ [2, n]} (4/3ε)i(1− 4/3ε)n−i (Lε=3/4)i · (NL)n−i
{z|♯l = 1} (4ε)(1 − 4/3ε)n−1 Lε=1/4 · (NL)n−1
{z|♯l = 0} 1−
∑
z|♯l≥1 p
z (NL)n
(16)
where Z is composed of n symbols ({l,⊥}n) and we write ♯l = i for a z which contains i symbols l.
The proof is analogue to the proof of Lemma 23. From the above box partition, we obtain the
following lemma.
Lemma 25. Assume a (2n + 1)-partite non-signaling distribution PXYZ|UVW such that PXY|UV
corresponds to n independent boxes with P (Xi ⊕ Yi = Ui · Vi) = 1 − ε. Then, whenever ε ≥
3
8·n+4 ,
there exists a box partition w such that for all outcomes z P z
XY|UV is such that at least one of the n
boxes is fully local.
Proof. We use the box partition given in Lemma 24. The probability to obtain an outcome Z such
that at least 1 of the n boxes given Z is fully local can be expressed as
∑
{z|♯l=i≥1}
pz =
2∑
i=n
(
n
i
)
(4/3ε)n−i(1− 4/3ε)i +
(
n
1
)
(4ε)(1 − 4/3ε)n−1
Because of the binomial formula, this probability is equal to 1 whenever
n · (4ε)(1 − 4/3ε)n−1 = n · (4/3ε)(1 − 4/3ε)n−1 + (1− 4/3ε)n

Therefore, whenever ε ≥ 38·n+4 , Eve can know 1 of the n bits with certainty. Or said differently, Eve
can know roughly a fraction of f = 1/n = 8ε3−4ε ≥ 8ε/3 of the bits with certainty.
G Proofs
G.1 All Non-Signaling Conditions
In this section, we show that Condition 1’ implies the non-signaling condition between all possible
subsets of interfaces of the box.
Lemma 26. Assume a system PXY Z|UVW such that∑
x
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v, w) =
∑
x
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u′, v, w) ∀y, z, v, w∑
y
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v, w) =
∑
y
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v′, w) ∀x, z, u,w∑
z
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v, w) =
∑
z
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v, w′) ∀x, y, u, v
Then it also holds that∑
xy
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v, w) =
∑
xy
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u′, v′, w) ∀z, w .
Proof. ∑
xy
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v, w) =
∑
x
∑
y
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v, w)
=
∑
x
∑
y
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v′, w) =
∑
y
∑
x
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u, v′, w)
=
∑
y
∑
x
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u′, v′, w) =
∑
xy
PXY Z|UVW (x, y, z, u′, v′, w)

G.2 Distance of Set given other Sets
The following lemma is used in the proof of Lemma 16.
Lemma 27. Assume random bits S1, . . . , Sk. If Sk is uniform given all linear combinations over
GF (2) of S1, . . . , Sk−1, i.e., PSk|
⊕
i∈I
(0) = PSk |
⊕
i∈I
(1) for all I ⊆ {1, . . . , k−1}, then Sk is uniform
given S1, . . . , Sk−1, i.e., PSk|S1...,Sk−1(0) = PSk|S1...,Sk−1(1).
Proof. We proof the case k = 3, the general case follows by induction. We have to show that
if PS3|S1 , PS3|S2 and PS3|S1⊕S2 are uniform, then PS3|S1,S2 is uniform. Consider the probabilities
PS1,S2,S3 . Because PS3|S1 is uniform, we obtain the constraints
PS1,S2,S3(0, 0, 0) + PS1,S2,S3(0, 1, 0) = PS1,S2,S3(0, 0, 1) + PS1,S2,S3(0, 1, 1) (17)
PS1,S2,S3(1, 0, 0) + PS1,S2,S3(1, 1, 0) = PS1,S2,S3(1, 0, 1) + PS1,S2,S3(1, 1, 1) .
Because PS3|S2 is uniform,
PS1,S2,S3(0, 0, 0) + PS1,S2,S3(1, 0, 0) = PS1,S2,S3(0, 0, 1) + PS1,S2,S3(1, 0, 1)
PS1,S2,S3(0, 1, 0) + PS1,S2,S3(1, 1, 0) = PS1,S2,S3(0, 1, 1) + PS1,S2,S3(1, 1, 1) . (18)
And from the fact that PS3|S1⊕S2 is uniform, we obtain
PS1,S2,S3(0, 0, 0) + PS1,S2,S3(1, 1, 0) = PS1,S2,S3(0, 0, 1) + PS1,S2,S3(1, 1, 1) (19)
PS1,S2,S3(0, 1, 0) + PS1,S2,S3(1, 0, 0) = PS1,S2,S3(0, 1, 1) + PS1,S2,S3(1, 0, 1) .
Then substract (18) from (17) and add (19) to obtain
2 · PS1,S2,S3(0, 0, 0) = 2 · PS1,S2,S3(0, 0, 1) , (20)
which implies
PS3|S1=0,S2=0(0) =
PS1,S2,S3(0, 0, 0)
PS1,S2,S3(0, 0, 0) + PS1,S2,S3(0, 0, 1)
= PS3|S1=0,S2=0(1) . (21)
Uniformity for all other values of S1, S2 then follows directly from the above equations. 
G.3 Linear Combination of Random Vectors
The following lemma is used in the proof of Lemma 16.
Lemma 28. Assume u and v are n-bit vectors and PU is the uniform distribution over all these
vectors. Define the vector w = u⊕ v. Then w is again distributed according to the uniform distribu-
tion.
Pu←PUPv←PU (u⊕ v) = Pw←PU (w) .
Proof. The uniform distribution over all n-bit vectors can be obtained by drawing each of the n-bits
at random, i.e., P (0) = P (1) = 1/2. The XOR of two random bits is again a random bit, i.e.,
P (0) = P (1) = 1/2 and therefore, w is also a vector drawn according to the uniform distribution
over all n-bit vectors. 
G.4 Average Epsilon
The following lemma is used in the proof of Lemma 16.
Lemma 29. Assume a variable εi for i = 1, . . . , n with average ε =
1
n ·
∑
i εi. Then
∑
K⊆n
∏
i∈K
εi ≤
∑
K⊆n
∏
i∈K
ε.
Proof. We will show that when replacing ε1 and ε2 by their average, the value of the above expression
only gets bigger. The lemma then follows by repeating to combine εi in pairs and replacing them
by their average. First note that replacing ε1 and ε2 by
ε1+ε2
2 each does not change the average
ε. Now calculate
∑
K⊆n
∏
i∈K(4εi). For this, divide the sets K into different categories: The ones
which contain neither ε1 nor ε2, which we call K
∅; the ones which contain either ε1 or ε2 which we
call Kε1 (Kε2); and the ones which contain both ε1 and ε2 called K
ε1ε2 .
∑
K⊆n
∏
i∈K
εi =
∑
K∅
∏
i∈K
εi +
∑
Kε1
∏
i∈K
εi +
∑
Kε2
∏
i∈K
εi +
∑
Kε1ε2
∏
i∈K
εi = (1 + ε1 + ε2 + ε1ε2) ·
∑
K∅
∏
i∈K
εi.
When replacing ε1 and ε2 by
ε1+ε2
2 each, clearly
∑
K∅
∏
i∈K εi stays the same and the value of
1 + ε1 + ε2 + ε1ε2 only becomes larger because ε1ε2 ≤
(
ε1+ε2
2
)2
. 
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